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Abstract 
 
Only 17 out of 435 congressional races in 2004 were decided by 9 points or less. 
Observers and scholars with perspectives as disparate as Thomas Friedman, Michael 
McConnell, Samuel Issacharoff, and Lexington in the Economist have connected the 
practice of incumbent protecting gerrymanders with these one-sided outcomes and a 
resulting shrillness and ideological rigidity in our contemporary politics. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court continues to treat incumbency protection as a traditional and 
acceptable redistricting principle. This article argues that the Court’s position is wrong 
and that the Court should undertake to limit these kinds of gerrymanders. Part I of the 
Article sets out three lines of attack on these gerrymanders as they apply to congressional 
redistricting, arguing that they are inconsistent with the framers’ understanding of the 
purpose of elections, that they have locked in an undemocratic practice in a manner 
which makes them virtually immune to challenge, and that they deny non-aligned voters 
fair and effective representation in violation of the equal protection clause.  Part II then 
seeks to make the case for judicial regulation of excessive incumbent protection 
gerrymanders by showing, among other matters, that there is a manageable standard for 
identifying such gerrymanders and a reasonable way to remedy them. In the course of the 
article, I try to show how such regulation is consistent with our constitutional framework 
and is necessitated by the Court’s own approach to the political process. I also address 
possible objections to a suit challenging such gerrymanders on grounds of lack of 
standing, the political question doctrine, and concerns for federalism. 
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3Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case against Gerrymandering 
To Protect Congressional Incumbents 
 
Walter M. Frank 
 
Walt Whitman loved elections with their torchlight parades, unending campaign oratory 
and passionate divisions. For him, « the most powerful scene in the western world » 
was« the still small vibrating voice – America’s choosing day. »1
Had he been told that America’s real choosing days now occur long before the voters 
go to the polls, he would undoubtedly have disapproved. But, at least with respect to the 
House of Representatives, that is precisely the case. Today, most elections for Congress 
have all the suspense of driver’s license renewal and all the excitement of a trip to the 
mall. 
 
In the 2004 congressional election only 17 out of 435 races (a ratio of approximately 
one in twenty-five) were decided by nine points or less.2In Ohio and Florida, certainly 
two of the most contested states in the presidential election, only two out of forty-three 
congressional races were decided by less than twenty points.3 Outside of Texas where a 
special and virtually unprecedented interim redistricting occurred aimed at eliminating 
Democratic incumbents, only 3 incumbents were defeated in the general election.  
 
The 2002 congressional election, the first election following the latest round of 
redistricting, had similar results: 
 
« Only four challengers knocked off incumbents in the 
November 2002 general election – a modern record low not 
only for a redistricting year, but for any election year. In 
California, none of the 50 general-election challengers 
garnered even 40% of the total vote.....On average, the 435 
victorious candidates won a higher percentage of the 
 
1 Walt Whitman, « Election Day, 1884 », In Walt Whitman, Complete Poems, Penguin Classics, 586 (2004 
edition). 
2 Compiled from information available in Wikipedia   
http://wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._House_election%2C_2004. 
3 Id. 
4popular vote than in any House election in more than half a 
century. »4
While incumbency brings with it many competitive advantages (including name 
recognition, enhanced fundraising ability, and the opportunity to perform services for 
grateful constituents), there is no question but that redistricting affords the parties a major 
opportunity to protect incumbents, especially otherwise vulnerable incumbents.  The 
2000 redistricting in particular was marked by a largely successful effort by both parties 
to protect their most vulnerable members.5
Many thoughtful commentators have lamented these developments. One leading 
scholar generally viewed as a conservative has written: 
 
« The problem has become particularly acute with modern 
computer districting software which allows map-makers to 
create imaginative districts with the precision of a surgeon. 
The results? Protection for incumbents, a tendency toward 
homogeneous-and hence more partisan districts, racial and 
partisan gerrymandering, and, ultimately, a widespread 
sense that elections do not matter. »6
Single member House districts are not constitutionally mandated. The requirement has 
been imposed on the state legislatures by federal statute since 18427 pursuant to 
Congress’s authority under Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution.  
 
In Gaffney v. Cummings8, decided in 1973, the Supreme Court upheld a districting 
plan for the Connecticut state legislature, citing its political fairness to the two parties. 
The plan, relying on an analysis of past election results, created safe seats for both parties 
roughly in proportion to their voting strength in the State. « The reality is, » wrote Justice 
White, « that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences. »9In so holding, the Court implicitly accepted the principle of incumbent 
protection.  
 
And while Gaffney involved a plan for redistricting a state legislature, in White v. 
Weiser,10 decided on the same day as Gaffney, the Court indicated that avoiding contests 
 
4 Sam Hirsch,  The United States House of Unrepresentatives : What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of 
Congressional Redistricting , 2 Election L.J. 179, 182 (2003).   
5 Id. at 186: « Redistricting significantly strengthened ‘at risk’ incumbents. » 
6 Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases : Original Mistakes and Current Consequences,24 
Harv. J. Of L. And Pol. 103 at 103-104. See also Sally Dworak-Fisher, Drawing the Line on Incumbency 
Protection, 2 Mich. J. Race and L. 131 at 135 (1996) : « Incumbents’ political ability to more accurately 
manipulate the outcome of elections through database information, computer information, and computer 
programs has exacerbated traditional unease with self-dealing and increased scrutiny of the redistricting 
process. »  
7Act of June 25, 1842, s 2, 5 Stat. 491 
8 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
9 Id. At 753. 
10 412 U.S. 783 (1973) 
5between congressional incumbents might be a legitimate state interest sufficient to justify 
deviations in the rigid standard of population equality for congressional districts.11 
As for the current Court, in Vieth v. Jubelirer12, Justice Scalia, writing for himself, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas, called incumbent 
protection « a traditional and constitutionally acceptable districting principle »13 and 
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote, « Gaffney is settled law, 
and for today’s purposes, I would take as given its approval of bipartisan gerrymanders, 
with their associated goal of incumbent protection. »14 
The attitude of the Court toward incumbent gerrymandering is in direct contrast toward 
its view respecting excessive partisan gerrymanders. Though the Court has found it 
virtually impossible to agree on a manageable standard for regulating such gerrymanders, 
it appears almost unanimous in regarding them as a constitutional violation.15 
In a recent article, two noted scholars wrote, « The Justices, recent opinions almost 
entirely ignore the question whether judicial intervention should be directed at 
entrenchment itself, rather than the secondary question of who gets to be entrenched. »16 
Such omission is unfortunate since excessive incumbent gerrymandering is both more 
dangerous if uncorrected and more amenable to judicial regulation than partisan 
gerrymandering.  
 
The goal of this article is to advance these propositions specifically with respect to 
redistricting for the House of Representatives. 
 
I make two central arguments : (1) a state redistricting plan which results in an 
overwhelming number of non-competitive districts should be held presumptively 
unconstitutional as an excessive incumbent protection gerrymander and (2)  the Court can 
establish a manageable standard for identifying,  and a workable remedy for correcting, 
such gerrymandering.  
 
In Part I of this article I argue that pervasive incumbent protection plans are 
unconstitutional, in the context of Congressional redistricting, because (a) they destroy 
the accountability that frequent elections were intended to achieve; (b) they are 
inconsistent with fundamental democratic principles which the Supreme Court has held 
to be of constitutional dimension; and (c) they constitute a denial of equal protection to 
independent voters. While each claim stands separately, together they may be viewed as 
 
11 Id. at 791-792. 
12 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
13 Id. at 298. 
14 Id. at 352. 
15 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, even the four justices who would have ended the project of fashioning a standard 
for excessive partisan gerrymandering did not deny that it constituted a constitutional violation. (See 
quotation from Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cited at Note 57.) 
16 Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political 
Gerrymanders, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 at 543 (2004-2005). 
6different perspectives on the same problem since each line of attack ultimately points to 
the same remedy. 
 
I argue in Part II that the Supreme Court should address the issue of pervasive 
incumbent gerrymandering because (a) a principled and manageable standard for 
handling such cases can be formulated; (b) potential objections to the judiciary’s entering 
into this arena, primarily objections based on lack of standing, the political question 
doctrine, and concerns for federalism, are answerable; (c) a workable remedy can be 
fashioned that will not involve the judiciary in micro-managing politics around the 
country; and (d) our constitutional structure and the logic of the Supreme Court’s own 
decisions make it both necessary and appropriate for the Supreme Court to deal with this 
question.  
 
In Part II I propose as a manageable standard the concept of a mathematical formula 
for non-competitiveness state-wide based on the number of districts which result in 
victory margins in excess of a certain percentage. I argue that the creation of such a 
formula is completely in line with current Supreme Court precedents. I look at the 
potential objections to such a formula and also consider the wisdom of initially leaving to 
the lower courts the creation of state specific standards of non-competitiveness. I also 
propose that the remedy for a violation should be process driven, taking away from the 
legislature any authority to redraw lines once a violation has been established. In effect, I 
am suggesting as a remedy what Professor Issacharoff has proposed as a guiding 
constitutional principle in the first instance, namely that self-interested actors should not 
be drawing district lines.17 I would be willing to give the legislature one bite of the apple 
but not two. I conclude Part II by pointing to a number of factors which I believe make 
the Court’s regulation of the incumbent gerrymander both necessary and appropriate, 
including that such regulation furthers a variety of interpretive approaches to 
constitutional decision-making. 
 
* * *
Incumbent protection gerrymandering is an important topic not only because it 
involves the degrading of a fundamental right but also because it goes to the heart of what 
kind of democracy we will enjoy. The result of so many « safe » districts, as one well 
known observer has recently pointed out, is that « few candidates have to build cross-
party coalitions around the middle ».18 Consequently, the system produces candidates 
« who appeal only to their party’s base – so we end up with a Congress paralyzed 
between the far left and the far right. »19 As noted, the Supreme Court in Gaffney 
recognized that districting has substantial political consequences. As I hope to show in 
this article, when one of those consequences is the virtual elimination of competitive 
elections, we have an issue of constitutional dimension. 
 
17 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harvard L. Rev. 593 (2002) 
18 Thomas L. Friedman, Thou Shall Not Destroy the Center, N.Y. Times, November 11, 2005, at A23. 
19 Id. 
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A. A redistricting plan marked by a pervasive concern for incumbent protection is a 
constitutional violation because it directly undermines the original constitutional intent 
respecting the nature and purpose of House elections.  
 
1. Elections and Accountability. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, most 
legislative representatives were elected for a one year term. In fact, the conventional 
wisdom was « Where annual elections end, tyranny begins. »20 Madison believed that 
frequent elections would inevitably assure a continual turnover of all but the ablest 
representatives. 21 
In No. 57 of the Federalist Papers, Madison argued that elections would assure 
congressional accountability. There Madison addresses the charge that the House of 
Representatives will inevitably « be taken from that class of representatives which will 
have least sympathy with the mass of the people. » 22Answering this objection, he first 
points to a number of factors making it unlikely that a representative would ignore the 
mass of his constituents. But then Madison adds: 
 
« All these securities would be found insufficient without 
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth 
place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to 
support in the members an habitual recollection of their 
dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed 
on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be 
effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to 
anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when 
their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must 
descend from the level from which they were raised; there 
forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust 
shall have established their title to a renewal of it. »23 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
When representatives choose their voters to perpetuate themselves in power, Madison’s 
vision is compromised beyond recognition. 
 
20 See The Federalist No. 53 (James Madision) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1961, Harvard University Press, 
1961) reprinted as Barnes and Noble Books edition p. 364 (2004).  
21 Id. at 368. 
22 The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1961, Harvard University Press, 1961) 
reprinted as Barnes and Noble Books edition p. 383 (2004). 
23 Id. at 385 
82. Framers’ fear of manipulative power of legislators. The framers of the Constitution 
genuinely feared that representatives could perpetuate themselves in office by changing 
the rules of the game. Indeed, the Supreme Court cited that fear in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton24, to be discussed later, to show that individual states could not add to the 
qualifications fixed in the Constitution for holding congressional office.25 
Two statements made during the framers’ debate over the qualifications clause (both 
were quoted by the Court in Thornton) illustrate this viewpoint. Hugh Williamson, a 
delegate from North Carolina,  expressed the fear that if Congress was composed of « any 
particular description of men, of lawyers for example....future elections might be secured 
to their own body. »26 In the same debate, Madison noted, « a Republic may be 
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of 
being elected, as the number authorized to elect. »27.
3. Elections and Legitimacy. Madison’s views expressed in the Federalist and the 
debates at the Constitutional convention are not our only sources for the historical 
understanding of elections. Professor Rebecca Brown, citing the work of Edmund 
Morgan, has shown that colonial elections were viewed not as mechanisms for translating 
the will of the majority into public policy but were really about accountability in the 
sense of serving as the check, the primary and perhaps only check, on entrenched 
power.28 « A virulent and prolonged debate, » she writes, « about the nature of 
accountability in the government went on for years, before, during, and after the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution. »29 She continues: 
 
« The view of those who ultimately prevailed in the debate 
over accountability was expressed in 1787 by Benjamin 
Rush : ‘It is often said that « the sovereign and all other 
power is seated in the people.’ This idea is unhappily 
expressed. It should be – ‘all power is derived from the 
people.’ They possess it only on the days of their elections.
After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they 
exercise it or resume it, unless it is abused. »30 (emphasis 
added) 
 
The highlighted language from Benjamin Rush’s statement is particularly telling 
because it underscores the prevailing view at the time of the writing of the Constitution 
 
24 514 U.S. 779 (1995) 
25 Id. at 790-791.2   
26 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) quoted in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton, Supra, Note 19 at 791. 
27 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.249-250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) quoted in U.S. Term 
Limits v. Thornton, Supra, Note 19 at 790-791.  
28 Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (1998). See 
discussion at 558 to 571. 
29 Id. at 568. 
30 Id. at 568. 
9that the « people » govern themselves only in the sense that they choose those who are to 
govern them. The vehicle for that choosing is of course our electoral system.31 
Thus, when incumbents are allowed to manipulate district lines to help assure their 
own re-election, they are not just playing politics, they are sabotaging the sole source of 
their authority to govern.  It is certainly true that political parties were not within the 
contemplation of the framers who indeed feared the factions which have in fact become, 
through the two party system, the organizing principle of modern politics. But the fact is 
that pervasive incumbent gerrymandering is not in furtherance of a two party system but 
of a one-party, the Democratic-Republican, system. In any event, regardless of the 
vehicle, fixing election outcomes in advance is hardly consistent with the notion of 
elections as the legitimating source of legislative governance. 
 
* * *
The power of incumbency in a society immeasurably more complex than Madison 
could have ever imagined is a given. As previously noted, much of that power is 
inevitable given the advantages of incumbency.  But when the judiciary adds to these 
advantages by giving a free pass to a redistricting motive so at odds with the intent of the 
framers, it places politics on much too high a pedestal.  
 
B. Gerrymandering for incumbent protection when carried to extremes is also a 
constitutional violation because it offends basic democratic principles in a way that is not 
amenable to change through the normal political processes. Elections are the normal 
political proocess for effectuating changes in membership in the House of 
Representatives but excessive incumbent gerrymanders are intended to damage the 
efficacy of that process. 
1. A dead-end street. Baker v. Carr32 established that legislative practices which seek to 
freeze the status quo in ways which are beyond the ordinary power of the electorate to 
reverse can be unconstitutional and are the judiciary’s business.  
In his monumental work on the reapportionment revolution, Robert Dixon endorsed 
Baker v. Carr and its progeny because « when political avenues for redressing political 
problems become dead-end streets some judicial intervention in the politics of the people 
may be essential in order to have any effective politics. »33 
The growing effectiveness of incumbent friendly redistrictings over the past few 
decades has come close to creating the same dead end street for competitive elections to 
 
31 For an additional perspective which also emphasizes the key role of elections in the constitutional 
structure, See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory, 153 U. Rev. 459 at 476-477. Professor Ortiz concludes, “Nearly 
every special feature of the House’s design was meant to ensure that it, unlike other primary structures of 
the federal government, was highly responsive to public sentiment.” (at 477.) 
32 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
33 Robert G. Dixon Jr.,  Democratic Representation – Reapportionment in Law and Politics, 8 (1968). 
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the House. Theoretically, state legislatures (or redistricting commissions in the few states 
which utilize them for congressional redistricting)34 can enact legislation making 
competitiveness a redistricting value. Only Iowa, however, has gone so far as to require 
that the legislatively created commission charged with the initial responsibility for 
drawing a plan must ignore political data. Not coincidentally, « Iowa is the only state to 
attempt to conduct redistricting via a politically neutral body. »35 In some states, 
appointed commissions believe that a key part of their role is to protect incumbents in 
order to protect the state’s influence in Congress.36 
The defeat of the redistricting initiatives in Ohio and California in 2005 also 
underscores how the political parties can mobilize to defeat redistricting efforts not 
perceived to be in their best interest. As one article noted, « The problem with both the 
California and Ohio Initiatives was not that voters don’t want reform, it’s that they 
perceived these two initiatives as partisan power grabs. And the voters were largely 
right. »37 
Incumbent protection works with ever increasing effectiveness due to a combination of 
factors: (1) the identification of many voters with one or the other of the two major 
parties (2) the resulting predictability of voting patterns;38 and (3) the enormous power 
that today’s computer technology affords legislators to harness that predictability to 
create gerrymandered districts. 
 
Districts packed with enough solid Democratic or Republican votes make it virtually 
impossible for any challenger from the other party or an independent to succeed.  When 
the two parties come together for the purpose of manipulating election results in advance, 
there is no real political check on that behavior. 
 
Pervasive incumbent gerrymandering is actually more of a ‘dead-end street’ than 
partisan gerrymandering because at least in partisan gerrymandering, the party 
 
34 The States that use a commission for congressional redistricting are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
New Jersey and Washington with Indiana using one if the legislature cannot pass a plan. Arizona’s 
commission was created through passage of a voter initiative. See Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth at 541 
U.S. 267 at 363 (2004). 
35 Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 837 at 848 (1997). 
36 New Jersey provides one example. See Donald Scarini and Nomi Lowy, Congressional Redistricting in 
New Jersey, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 821 at 832-835 (2003). For a broader treatment of the subject of 
redistricting commissions, see Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex. L. 
Rev. 837 (1997). For an article giving a good ground level view of redistricting in one state, see Timothy P. 
Brennan, Note, Cleaning out the Augean Stables : Pennsylvania Most Recent Redistricting and a Call to 
Clean Up this Messy Process, 13 Widener L.J. 235 (2003). 
37 Sam Hirsch and Thomas E. Mann, For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat, the New York Times, 
November 11, 2005, p. A23. 
38 « In the November 2002 elections 86% of all successful House candidates belonged to the same party as 
the presidential candidate who carried the District in November 2000 – a level of consistency unmatched 
since the 1940’s. » Hirsch, supra Note 2 at p. 185. In the 2004 elections, the percentage was almost exactly 
the same. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._presidential_election_2004. The information is contained 
in Section 3.5. 
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controlling the redistricting process faces risks when it engages in extreme 
gerrymandering. If it tries to spread its vote over too many districts, it decreases its 
margin of error and creates less safe seats, something abhorrent to all incumbents 
regardless of party. This is what Justice O’Connor meant when she argued that partisan 
gerrymandering is essentially a « self-limiting enterprise. »39 No such check exists with 
respect to incumbent gerrymandering. When there is a shared goal of maximizing 
incumbent protection, the more lopsided the margins the more the gerrymandering goal 
has been accomplished. To use the current terminology, partisan gerrymandering depends 
upon a combination of « packing » and « cracking ». Incumbent protection is only about 
packing. 
 
The political impact of the Supreme Court’s willingness to tolerate pervasive 
incumbent gerrymandering is heightened by the Court’s decision in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton.40 In this case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state constitutional 
amendment enacted by the voters of Arkansas with the admitted goal of eliminating 
career legislators in the Congress (as well as the State legislature). The Arkansas 
amendment, among other things, denied ballot access to congressional candidates who 
had been elected to two terms to the United States Senate or three terms to the House. 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the amendment constituted an additional 
qualification for office and that the Constitution did not allow states to impose additional 
qualifications.  
 
The effect of this decision was to invalidate the one direct avenue voters had to 
overcome the long term effects of the incumbent protection gerrymander. As a measure 
of the depth of feeling on this issue, it should be noted that following U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton, the voters of Nebraska, South Dakota, Maine, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Arkansas and Oklahoma each passed initiatives (ultimately found unconstitutional in 
each case by Circuit Courts of Appeal) intended to encourage the passage of a federal 
constitutional amendment allowing for the establishment of congressional term limits.41 
2. Inconsistency with Democratic values. Professor Sunstein has suggested that 
deliberative democracy, that is democracy that sees real value in the meaningful 
participation of the broad electorate, has two goals:  « political accountability and reason-
giving. »42 I would argue that incumbent protection gerrymanders deeply offend both 
goals : certainly political accountability is diminished when political parties through 
redistricting reconfigure  constituencies for the purpose of assuring the re-election of their 
own incumbents and reason-giving is also undermined since incumbents having no fear 
of defeat have no real reason to explain themselves or their actions. 
 
While perhaps not of direct constitutional relevance, I would also submit that it 
violates democratic principles to treat individuals as nothing more than statistical 
aggregates.  
 
39 Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986). 
40 Supra, Note 24. 
41 See Cook v. Gralike 531 U.S. 510, 518 note 10 (2001). 
42 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time – Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court, 31 (1999). 
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In his dissent in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,43 Justice Stewart wrote: 
 
« Legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They 
represent people, or more accurately a majority of the 
voters in their districts – people with identifiable needs and 
interests which require legislative representation and which 
can often be related to the geographic areas in which these 
people live. »44 
Voters are not faceless numbers and a districting plan that counts their votes before 
they are cast renders their vote as meaningless as a process which fails to count them 
afterwards.   
 
3. A distortion of the purpose of geographic based districting. Pervasive incumbent 
gerrymandering plans also diminish the constitutional validity underlying the whole 
process of drawing geographic lines. When Congress first enacted the requirement of 
single member districts, it did so because it recognized that in an at large election, many 
interests in the State might not be represented.45 Districting was created not to minimize 
competition but to assure that there were many competitions so that in effect one 
competitive result would not prevail throughout the State. Balkanizing a State in such a 
way as to eliminate competition was the farthest thing from Congress’s mind in 1842 
when it introduced the requirement of single member districts. 
 
The drawing of geographic lines should relate in significant part to geographic factors 
that enhance the effectiveness of representation. So-called neutral factors which focus on 
compactness, recognizing communities of interest, and keeping the entirety of a 
municipality or county within the same congressional district, all arguably enhance the 
goal of effective representation and thus are rationally related to the process of drawing 
geographic lines. Incumbency gerrymanders (and partisan gerrymanders) on the other 
hand merely seek to use geographic boundaries to accomplish a political purpose.  
 
Commentators have made the point, correctly I believe, that no basis for drawing 
geographic lines is completely neutral since even the choice of neutral criteria will almost 
 
43 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
44 Id. At 750.  Stewart argued unsuccessfully in Lucas that because geographic districting “carries with it 
an acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional needs and interest” (at 750), Colorado 
should be allowed to redistrict at least one of its legislative bodies on something other than the one man one 
vote principle. The majority, in Lucas did not dispute that geographic districting to advance representation 
based on regional needs was appropriate but made that goal of districting subject to the one man one vote 
principle. 
45« The 1842 law was inspired in large part by complaints that statewide elections of congressional 
candidates had resulted in a state’s single dominant political party winning all of that state’s congressional 
seats, thereby impairing the ability of political parties in Congress to fulfill their role of representing a large 
coalition of diverse interests. » Howard A. Scarrow, Vote Dilution, Party Dilution, and the Voting Rights 
Act: The Search for Fair and Effective Representation, in Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, 
Bernard Grofman, ed., p.45 (1990).  
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inevitably assist one party more than the other.46 Moreover, it is naive to believe that 
politics will not play some role in the districting process. It does not follow, however, 
from either of these concessions that redistricting meets constitutional standards when it 
degenerates into a wholesale effort to deny voters a meaningful choice in the general 
election and to perpetuate those in power. 
 
4.  Practical effects as inconsistent with the healthy democracy and stable two party 
systems which the Court ostensibly seeks to promote in its decisions governing the 
political process.
The Supreme Court has endorsed a stable two party system as a good thing47 and a 
legitimate objective of state legislation. 48 
A stable two party system has been deemed worthy of constitutional protection by the 
Court and commentators in part because the parties have been viewed as non-ideological 
in nature. 
 
In a dissent in a 1973 case joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, Justice 
Powell wrote: 
 
« Political parties in this country traditionally have been 
categorized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership... »49 
In 1981, in a dissent joined in by Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Powell wrote: 
 
46 See Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public 
Interest : Elusive or Illusory, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1985) where the authors after examining a number 
of formal criteria, such as compactness, municipal boundaries and communities of interest conclude, 
« From a practical standpoint, the most serious defect of the formal criteria is that, without justification, 
they tend systematically to favor one of the two major parties.»  
47 Justice O’Connor, for example, has written, « There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong 
and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government. 
The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the 
continued vitality of our two party system, which permits both stability and measured change. » Davis v. 
Bandemer, Supra Note39 at p. 144-145. 
48 Recent cases upholding such objective against claimed burdens on rights of  independent voters and 
independent and third party candidacies include : Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428 (1992) holding that 
prohibition of write-in voting was not unconstitutional; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party 520 U.S. 
351 (1997) upholding anti-fusion legislation; California Democratic Party v. Jones 530 U.S. 567 (2000) 
invalidating the blanket primary; and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666        
(1998) upholding right of state-owned public television to exclude an independent candidate from a 
televised debate. Earlier cases upholding state ballot access and registration requirements include Jenness v. 
Fortson 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752 (1973); American Party of Texas v. 
White 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724 (1974); and Munro v. Socialist Workers Party 
479 U.S. 189 (1986). 
49 Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973). 
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« The Democratic Party is not organized around the 
achievement of defined ideological goals. »50 
In 1996, in a dissent joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia as to 
Parts I and III of the dissent, Justice Thomas wrote: 
 
« American political parties, generally speaking, have numerous  
 members with a wide variety of interests, [citations omitted]  
 features necessary for success in majoritarian elections. »51 
There is, I believe, a direct linkage between the Court’s belief in the essentially non-
ideological nature of American political parties and its promotion of a stable two party 
system.          
 
More and more, however, commentators have noticed the increasingly ideological 
nature of our political parties and lay the blame in substantial part on the doorstep of 
incumbency protection. I previously quoted a recent column by Thomas Friedman to this 
effect.52 In a similar vein, Lexington in the Economist has written: 
 
« ....The most striking thing about American politics is the 
disjunction between the opinions of ordinary Americans 
and the behavior of the political elites......A growing 
proportion of Democrats come from deep-blue 
congressional districts where it is more important to pander 
to the liberal base than to reach across the aisles. And the 
Republicans are doing everything they can to make the 
middle ground uninhabitable......Revolt is growing, 
particularly in the west against the institutionalized 
gerrymandering that hands power to the political 
extremes. »53 (emphasis added).   
 
Scholars have come to the same conclusion. Thus Professors Karlan and Issacharoff 
write, « The pervasive consequence of the incumbent gerrymander is that it skews the 
distribution politically by driving the center out of elective office at the legislative 
level. »54 
Our two party system has produced effective governance because it has produced a 
system in which people can broadly identify with the discernibly different principles and 
 
50 Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin 450 U.S. 107, 131 (1981). 
51 Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996). 
52 Supra, Note 18. 
53 Lexington, « Slumbering On, » the Economist, April 9, 2005, p. 28. 
54 Supra, Note 16, at 574. 
15
interests represented by the two parties but still be reasonably comfortable in turning to 
either party when the party in power is no longer regarded as doing an effective job. 
 
To the extent that the two party system no longer plays that role, the Court, given its 
own underlying premise regarding the non-ideological nature of our political parties, 
needs to be concerned.  
 
One political scientist has noted, « When they [the major parties] are functioning 
well, » they submerge racial, ethnic and religious differences « in a joint search for 
communal victory. »55 Incumbent friendly gerrymanders negate this important role of 
political parties because there is no need for ‘a joint search for communal victory’ in an 
electoral landscape devoid of real competition.  
 
Vigorous campaigns require that the parties engage each other and the voters. When 
they don’t, a critical element in developing democratic consensus is lost and a political 
atmosphere develops in which constructive debate and coalition building does not count 
for much. Their absence in the electoral process inevitably carries over into the governing 
process and may help explain the decline of both civility and consensus building in our 
governing culture, particularly in the House of Representatives.  
 
By making a stable two party system the basis of so many of its decisions56, the Court 
has implicitly assumed responsibility for assuring that the system is working in a way that 
promotes effective governance. That does not mean that the Court is somehow 
responsible for controlling or even influencing political outcomes.  Nor is it responsible 
for how nicely people play in the sand box. But it does mean that, by entering the 
political thicket, it bears some responsibility for assuring that the stable two party system 
it promotes is not itself undermining our system of governance. When persons on all 
points along the political spectrum see a direct connection between the absence of real 
competition in our congressional elections and a growing disfunction in our governing 
process, that is a matter which should concern the Court in the limited sphere in which it 
does operate. And since incumbent protection is itself a result of a statutory scheme 
mandated by Congress, regulation of such protection is well within that limited sphere. 
 
5. A violation of democratic principles in and of itself can be unconstitutional without 
reference to any particular provision of the document. 
Even as conservative a justice as Justice Scalia has implicitly recognized that a 
violation of democratic principles raises issues of constitutional import. Thus, in his 
plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, he wrote: 
 
55 Gerald Pomper 1980. The Contribution of Political Parties to American Democracy,  In Party Renewal 
in America, edited by Gerald Pomper, p. 6,  quoted in Howard A. Scarrow, Vote Dilution, Party Dilution, 
and the Voting Rights Act: The Search for Fair and Effective Representation in Political Gerrymandering 
and the Courts, Bernard Grofman, ed.,  p.46 (1990). 
56 See cases cited at Note 48. 
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« Much of his [Justice Stevens’] dissent is addressed to the 
incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with 
democratic principles. We do not disagree with that 
judgment.....The issue we have discussed is not whether 
severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but 
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has 
occurred, and to design a remedy. » (emphasis added). 57 
Clearly Justice Scalia in this passage equates a violation of democratic principles with 
a violation of the Constitution.   
 
The one man one vote principle for congressional elections has been located by the 
Court in Article I Section 2 of the Constitution,58 which provides for election to the 
House of Representatives « by the people of the several States. ». A textual argument can 
be made that incumbent gerrymandering violates this provision since incumbent 
gerrymanders result in representatives who have effectively elected themselves. Even if 
one views this as a strained interpretation, the absence of a particular textual reference 
should not be decisive, for as Professor Issacharoff has noted, « There is no narrow 
textual justification for almost any body of law governing the political process. »59 
Moreover, since the single member district system for election to the House of 
Representatives is imposed on the States by Congressional legislation, the absence of any 
textual reference in the Constitution to how districting should  be implemented should 
carry little weight.  
 
C. A state plan marked by pervasive incumbent redistricting is also unconstitutional 
because it violates the right of the voter not affiliated with either major party to fair and 
effective representation. 
 
The constitutional violations described in A and B above harms all voters by 
undermining the very purpose and democratic value of elections. (The possible standing 
issue raised by this level of inclusiveness is discussed further in Part II below.) 
 
In this Section C, I urge that independent voters are denied fair and effective 
representation by pervasive incumbent protection gerrymandering. For purposes of this 
argument, I define independents as those registered voters who do not affiliate with either 
the Democratic or Republican parties since these voters are often accorded no role in the 
nominating process for congressional candidates and are clearly identifiable.  
 
The phrase, « fair and effective representation » comes, of course, from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Reynolds v. Sims: 
 
57 Supra, Note 12 at 292. 
58 See Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
59 Samuel Issacharoff, Why elections, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 687 (2002). 
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« Since the achieving of fair and effective representation 
for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative 
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection 
Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation 
by all voters in the election of state legislators. »60 
As used in Reynolds v. Sims, fair and effective representation is supposed to be the 
end product of the reapportionment process and, by extension, redistricting as well. 
 
The question then becomes whether pervasive incumbent gerrymanders cause 
independents to suffer an invidious discrimination which results in a denial of their right 
to fair and effective representation. 
 
Special status of independents as a political element.
Independent voters form a substantial portion of the electorate. Over the last 30 years, 
approximately one-quarter to one-third of the population at any one time has 
characterized itself as independent with one-third of this group indicating no preference 
for either party and the remaining two-thirds indicating that they consider themselves 
closer to one of the two major parties than the other.61 
Independents by definition are uncomfortable with affiliating too closely with either 
major party. Their reasons may be many ranging across a broad spectrum of attitudes 
including fundamental disagreement with the principles of both parties, a belief that each 
party embodies some good and some not so good principles, or a belief that neither party 
has any principles at all. And, of course, the desire not to affiliate may have nothing to do 
with principle. In fact, it may simply be a matter of personal temperament or a product of 
family history or a dislike of the whole idea of political parties.  
 
Whatever the reasons, independents in competitive contests are coveted by both parties 
because, if they move clearly in one direction or another, they can determine the outcome 
of an election.  
 
Admittedly, suburban soccer moms or Roman Catholic blue collar workers are also 
often targeted as a group by one party or the other and can swing election outcomes.  
 
From a constitutional standpoint, however, independents (who certainly can include 
soccer moms and blue collar Roman Catholics in their number), should be deemed to 
enjoy a political status no different than Democrats or Republicans since such status is as 
much a function of the registration process as the status of Democrats and Republicans 
and a refusal to affiliate with either major party is as much a political statement as a 
decision to affiliate. Thus, if Democrats and Republicans are entitled to be protected from 
 
60 377 U.S. 533, 565-566 (1964). 
61 See the NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral behavior, Party Identification 7-Point Scale 1952-   
2002. 
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extreme partisan gerrymanders, there is certainly no reason why independents should not 
be protected from a gerrymander that works to eliminate their political influence. 
 
Indeed, the consistent degradation of a « voter or a group of voters’ influence on the 
political process as a whole »62 is precisely the injury independents suffer in the face of 
excessive incumbent gerrymandering. 
 
More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court declared that apportionment schemes deny 
equal protection when they « would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength 
of racial or political elements of the voting population. » (Emphasis added)63 More 
recently, the Supreme Court held that the major political parties are not required to allow 
voters to vote in blanket primaries even when the voters of the State have, by initiative, 
provided for that inclusion.64 When (a) independents are excluded by state law or internal 
party policy from participating in the nominating process of the major parties and (b) the 
major parties are constitutionally permitted to create a state delegation composed almost 
exclusively of safe seats, it seems clear that the voting strength of a major political 
element has been minimized if not cancelled out. 
 
2. Hybrid nature of the Violation.
The equal protection claim I am advancing sounds in both individual and group rights. 
Since the essential harm involves a denial of fair and effective representation based on 
the deprivation of the right to cast a meaningful vote and the elimination of any practical 
incentive to participate in the political process, the claim sounds strongly in individual 
rights, just as Baker v. Carr sounded in individual rights even though, as a practical 
matter, the case was ultimately about how rural interests had locked in their political 
power at the expense of urban interests. Since independents, for the reasons discussed 
above, are an important and clearly identifiable political element whose influence is all 
but eliminated in non-competitive elections, it may be equally appropriate to view the 
claim as resting in group harm as well. The hybrid nature of the claim is not a reflection 
of weakness but rather the result of the fundamentally incoherent theoretical framework 
laid down in the gerrymander cases which require that a group harm be examined through 
the prism of individual rights. 
 
3. Real injury.
Professors Pamela Karlan and Daryl Levinson have noted that the Supreme Court, in 
gerrymandering cases, « has identified two reasons for finding no injury »65 : 
 
« First, the ‘adequate representation’ theory holds that « 
[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a 
 
62 Bandemer, Supra, Note  39 at 132. 
63 Fortson v. Dorsey 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
64 California Democratic Party v. Jones 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
65 Pamela S. Karlan and Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201, 1209 (1996). 
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losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately 
represented by the winning candidate and to have as much 
opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in 
the district. » Second, the ‘virtual representation’ theory 
takes as a premise that the relevant political unit for 
determining the fairness of political influence is an entire 
jurisdiction, rather than a single district. Thus, Democratic 
voters in majority-Republican districts with Republican 
representatives will have their distinctively Democratic 
interests represented by Democratic representatives elected 
from other districts. » [citations omitted]66 
Neither the adequate representation theory nor the virtual representation theory 
provides a basis for denying a claim based on pervasive incumbent gerrymandering. In 
fact, the theory of virtual representation legitimizes looking at a pervasive incumbent 
gerrymander from the perspective of the entire state. The concept also underscores the 
way in which the independent voter is harmed by the pervasive incumbent gerrymander 
because the independent has no virtual representation in the same way that Democrats or 
Republicans do. With respect to « adequate representation’, it seems fanciful in the 
extreme to believe that a group that is given no opportunity to influence the electoral 
process in a meaningful way will still have as meaningful an opportunity to influence the 
winning candidate’s views as other voters.  
 
Let me briefly address three additional arguments against treating the incumbent 
gerrymander as posing a serious constitutional harm to independents. 
 
First, one might argue that independents can always register with a major party if they 
wish to influence a nominating process. I would respond that to require a voter to register 
as a Democrat or a Republican when, in fact, that voter does not actually view himself or 
herself as a Democrat or Republican just so that they might have some influence on the 
political process, would amount to a coercion of belief in violation of the First 
Amendment and in any event does not answer the real difficulty of minimizing or 
canceling out the voting strength of independents in the general election. 
 
Second, To those who might argue that independents can form their own parties and 
nominate their own candidates, I would point out that the two party system is so deeply 
entrenched in our political system, in no small way the result of a myriad of Supreme 
Court decisions, that such a right is simply not a realistic consolation for essentially being 
frozen out of the current political process. 
 
Finally, to those who might argue that even in highly one-sided districts, independent 
voters are not prevented from exercising their political rights and their vote will still be 
counted even though the result is a foregone conclusion, I would respond that the 
individual worker in Lochner67 could theoretically negotiate his own terms and  
 
66 Id. at 1209-1210. 
67 Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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conditions of employment. Today, we recognize that the worker’s right was in fact 
illusory and so too, I would argue, is the right of the independent, often undecided voter 
to participate in an election whose outcome has already been decided. 
.
Part II 
 
In 1986, in Davis v. Bandemer68 the Supreme Court ruled that claims of extreme 
partisan gerrymandering presented a justiciable issue. In 2003, in Vieth v. Jubelirer69,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion stated that it was time to reverse that decision since the 
seventeen years after Bandemer, to paraphrase a lengthy argument, had produced only a 
lot of dead trees and billable hours, no manageable standard for discovering excessive 
partisan gerrymandering having been found.70 
I mention this at the outset of this Section because there may be a presumption that if 
the Court can’t develop a manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering, it won’t be 
able to develop one for incumbent gerrymandering either. There is, however, a crucial 
distinction between the two claims. In partisan gerrymandering  the concept of vote 
dilution is critical since the claim is based upon unfairly dashed expectations of electoral 
success and to prove that case one must show the results that the party was entitled to 
expect but for the gerrymandered dilution of its vote. Vote dilution, however, is simply 
not relevant to an incumbent gerrymandering claim. The basis of an independent’s equal 
protection claim is being frozen out of meaningful participation in the political process 
not the dashing of legitimate expectations of electoral success. Similarly, the violations 
posited in Sections A and B of Part I are based on the fundamental incompatibility of 
excessive incumbent gerrymanders with the role that elections play in our constitutional 
and democratic processes.  
 
1. A Manageable Standard
Not long after Bandier was decided, Professor Bernard Grofman, a political scientist, 
suggested that the decision had created a clear and manageable standard for excessive 
partisan gerrymandering, namely that it must be « (1) intentional, (2) severe, and (3) 
predictably nontransient in its effects. » 71History has shown that Professor Grofman’s 
 
68 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
69 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
70 Justice Scalia wrote: « Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it justify us in 
revisiting the question whether the standard promised by Bandemer exists. » 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).  
71 Bernard Grofman,  Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering : Bandemer and Thornburg, in 
Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, Bernard Grofman, ed., p. 30 (1990). 
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interpretation of Bandemer discounted language in the opinion that made it virtually 
impossible for either major party to sustain an excessive partisan gerrymander claim.  
 
I would suggest, however, that Professor Grofman’s reading of the Bandemer standard 
is actually a manageable standard for an excessive incumbent protection gerrymandering 
claim.  
 
a.  Intentionality.
Intentionality should not be a difficult element of the standard to meet.    
 
In Bandemer, Justice White, in his plurality decision, wrote, « As long as redistricting 
is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political 
consequences of the reapportionment were intended. »72 
Moreover, intentionality can, consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in other 
cases,73, be inferred if the severity standard discussed below is met. As one scholar has 
noted:  
 
« Because public bodies do not confess invalid motives, 
courts must often use inferential methods of proof; that is, 
they must look at the effects. In many areas of the law, 
there is a strong inference that the natural and probable 
consequences of an action are intended. » 74 
Intentionality should also not be a problem since legislators have very rarely made a 
secret of their desire to protect themselves and their friends and, certainly in the 
circumstance of shared power, incumbent protection is the one motive that unites all 
legislators.  
 
b. Severity.
A standard for severity can be quantified based on a definition of competitiveness. A 
non-competitive district would be one in which the margin of victory was at least a 
certain number of percentage points (we’ll call it the Victory Spread). One possible 
standard would be that any plan in which at least x percentage (we’ll call it the 
Gerrymandered District Percentage) of the total of the districts in the state were won by 
the Victory Spread in the first election following redistricting would be presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
 
72 Bandemer, Supra, Note 39 at 129. 
73 See Rogers v. Lodge 458 U.S.  613, 623-627 (1982) where Court held that racially discriminatory intent 
could be inferred from a number of factors, including of particular relevance to our issue, failure of black 
candidates to be elected. 
74 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Districting and the Meanings of Pluralism : The Court’s futile search for standards 
in Jiryas Joel, in The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process, David K. Ryden, ed., p. 68 (2002). 
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 Establishing a statistical standard for non-competitiveness is well within the 
competence of the judiciary since it involves an objective inquiry into establishing that 
margin of victory which creates a strong presumption of continued success for an 
incumbent in the future.  
 
Determining the Gerrymandered District Percentage is admittedly more of a 
subjective, value-laden exercise. It is not, however, one the Court needs to shy away 
from. Courts strike balances all the time. In this case, the balance is between 
competitiveness as a value and incumbent protection. Establishing a minimum standard 
of competitiveness is no more subjective an exercise than the Court’s development of 
permitted deviations from the one man one vote principle for state legislative 
redistricting.75 
I accept as a given that it is very difficult, in analyzing the result of any one election 
district, to show that redistricting, as opposed to other factors favoring a particular 
incumbent, accounted for that incumbent’s success. But the basis of an incumbent 
gerrymander claim must necessarily involve evaluating a state districting plan as a whole. 
Incumbent gerrymandering becomes a particular constitutional problem not when one or 
two favored leaders or rising politicians are afforded extra comfort in a particular district 
but when the parties, taking advantage of their dominance of the political system, attempt 
to protect all or virtually all their own with safe seats.  
 
In short, while the motive of gerrymandering to protect incumbents, in the abstract, 
violates the Constitution whenever it occurs, it becomes an affront to the constitution 
requiring judicial intervention only when it is done wholesale, not retail, because it 
ultimately was wholesale entrenchment which worried the framers and it is only now 
when the practice has become so pervasive and so powerful that it  presents a basic 
affront to democratic principles and a denial, particularly with respect to independent 
voters, of the right to fair and effective representation. 
 
The development of a severity standard will not be without difficulties. Whether one 
quantitative standard should govern the entire country or whether it should be individual 
to a jurisdiction is, of course, something with which the courts will need to wrestle. It 
may be appropriate also, as a standard develops, to exclude individual districts from 
being counted toward the gerrymander under certain circumstances, for example, where 
the number of registered Democrats and Republicans in a district are shown to be 
registered in roughly equal numbers. Also, the total number of Democrats and 
Republicans in the State may need to be taken into account in establishing the 
Gerrymandered District Percentage. 
 
There would also need to be a careful evaluation of the impact of a finding of 
unconstitutionality on majority minority districts since they represent a normative value 
 
75 See Mahon v. Howell 410 U.S. 315 upholding a 16.4% deviation from ideal population equality for a 
redistricting plan for the Virginia state legislature. Obviously, there is nothing constitutionally magical 
about 16.4% but the Court did note that this percentage « may well approach tolerable limits. » (410 U.S. 
315, 329). 
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which should not be ignored in remedying an unconstitutional plan. In Mahan v. Howell, 
the Court declared: 
 
« ...it is open to the State, in the event it should fail to 
achieve the goal of population equality to attempt to justify 
its failure by demonstrating that precise equality could not 
be achieved without jeopardizing some critical 
governmental interest. »76 
The presence of majority minority districts could similarly excuse, in proper 
circumstances, what would otherwise be an unconstitutional plan under the severity 
standard. Or, recalling the Court’s suggestion in White v. Weiser that congressional equal 
population requirements might be relaxed to avoid clashes between incumbents, perhaps 
some minor relaxation of strict population equality for congressional districts could be 
allowed in the interests of a more competitive districting plan that would not significantly 
affect majority minority districts.  
 
From the standpoint of manageability, however, the key point is that defining the 
parameters of a non-competitive district is a much less speculative and subjective inquiry 
than the « what is fair » and « what might have been » benchmarks that have proved so 
elusive for identifying excessive partisan gerrymandering. 
 
The standard I have proposed is also inherently conservative. If the first election year 
following a redistricting is one in which one party does exceedingly well, it is unlikely 
that the incumbents of the disfavored party will consistently prevail to a degree meeting 
the severity standard except in a highly gerrymandered plan. On the other hand, if such 
election year results reflect normal election patterns, then a plan in which incumbents of 
both parties consistently win by the Victory Spread presumably will reflect a 
gerrymandered plan.  
 
I say « presumably » because a prima facie case could perhaps be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence that the districting plan was drawn by a truly independent 
commission or group which did not consider incumbent protection in developing its plan.  
 
The proposed approach is, of course, not the only possible one. Its focus, for example, 
on the election results immediately following the enactment of the plan might be seen as 
too limited a time period for either finding or not finding a violation although I would 
argue that the non-transience element of the proposed standard described below would 
provide some comfort for the finding of a violation based on one election. 
 
An alternative approach open to the Court would be simply to declare severe 
incumbent gerrymanders unconstitutional without locking itself in too early to a 
particular standard for non-competitiveness. We are in an area, after all, where the 
political science community and even the legislature (once resigned to a new era in 
 
76 410 U.S. 315, 340 (1973). 
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redistricting) can be very helpful in developing appropriate standards and in suggesting 
ways to integrate competitiveness as a value in the redistricting process.  
 
Just as Baker v. Carr established the justiciability of a claim rooted in 
malapportionment without simultaneously establishing a standard, so might the Court 
make clear that excessive incumbent gerrymanders are unconstitutional while leaving it 
to the lower courts initially to develop the criteria for identifying such violations. In terms 
of the framework proposed by Professor Sunstein for categorizing Supreme Court 
opinions, it may be best to initially render an opinion which would be wide in the sense 
of articulating a comprehensive constitutional norm but narrow in the sense that it would 
initially be left to the lower courts to determine the breadth of situations to which the rule 
would be applied.77 
c. Non-transience.
Finally, as to non-transience, the third element of Professor Groffman’s standard, this 
is a criteria in which the use of historical data would be appropriate.  If prior election data 
shows a history of one-sided election results on a level that would have raised a 
presumption of pervasive incumbent gerrymandering had such gerrymandering been 
previously a subject of judicial scrutiny, certainly such results would raise an inference 
that the current gerrymander would be equally effective.78 
2. Obstacles to Suit
a. Standing to Sue
Under Article III, Section 2, federal courts only have jurisdiction over a case or 
controversy. One element of that requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they 
have standing to sue. In United States v. Hays79, the Supreme Court held that the 
irreducible minimum for standing contains three elements: (1) injury in fact – defined as 
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, not 
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and conduct 
 
77 Supra Note 42. See particularly discussion at pages 16 to 19 with reference to Professor Sunstein’s 
nomenclature. 
78 While not completely analogous, it should be noted that it is not unusual for the Supreme Court, in 
seeking to evaluate whether a constitutional violation has occurred, to examine past history and behavior 
patterns. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the 
Court found that although the existence of single race schools did not establish a constitutional violation, 
there was a presumption, where the school had engaged in past de jure segregation, against schools 
substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. See also Hutts v. Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978) 
where the Court recognized that punitive isolation in a prison for more than 30 days, while not prohibited 
per se, was constitutionally forbidden in the context of an Arkansas prison system so deficient that its entire 
operation raised 8th Amendment issues. 
79 515 U.S. 737 (1995). 
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complained of; and (3) likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favorable 
decision.80 
An independent voter claiming a denial of equal protection based on exclusion from 
the political process should have no problem meeting the standing requirement since (a) 
the right to fair and effective representation is a legally protected interest, (b) the inability 
to cast an effective vote represents a real injury to that interest; (c) there is certainly a 
causal connection between the gerrymander and the degradation of that voting right; and 
(d) regulating incumbent gerrymandering to provide more competitiveness will afford a 
fair if not complete remedy for the injury. (While the relevant jurisdiction for the 
evaluation of the equal protection claim that I have proposed is the entire state, it is 
possible that the Supreme Court might require the independent voter to reside in one of 
the safe districts created by the Plan).81 
The standing problem is more complex when we consider the violations posited in 
Sections A and B of Part I.  Concepts like concreteness and particularity obviously can 
mean many different things depending upon the context. In the context of standing, some 
guidance is afforded by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reiteration in Raines v. Byrd that 
« standing is built on a single basic idea – the idea of separation of powers. »82 
With that basic understanding of the standing requirement in mind, it seems clear that a 
voter’s claim that his vote has been degraded by a legislature’s attempt to pervasively fix 
election outcomes is sufficiently concrete to meet a standing challenge. Indeed, the claim 
itself shows why the concept of separation of powers should be given little weight, for the 
very claim revolves around the allegation of an unconstitutional practice benefiting 
members of the very branch of the government to whom separation of powers would 
ordinarily require deference.  
 
Moreover, the injury to the voter posed by incumbent gerrymandering is as great and 
in fact more intimately connected to his or her status as a voter than the supposed injury 
to the white voters allowed to pursue their claims of racial gerrymandering in the Shaw 
line of cases.83 In these cases white voters in North Carolina were allowed to sue to 
overturn majority minority districts. The claim that plaintiffs brought, as one scholar has 
put it, was more about « feeling disenfranchised » than « being disenfranchised »84 and in 
the final analysis was « not a claim about voting rights at all. »85 What was a stake was 
the abstract proposition that gerrymanders should not be motivated primarily by racial 
considerations. Whether one agrees with the Shaw line of cases or not, a claim that all 
citizens are deprived of the right to participate meaningfully in the political process when 
 
80 Id. at  742-743. 
81 In United States v. Hays, the Court held that a plaintiff complaining of an alleged racial gerrymander had 
to reside in the District about which the claim was being made. 
82 Raines v. Byrd 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997). 
83 Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt 517 U.S. 899 (1996); and Easley v. Cromartie 532 
U.S. 234 (2001).   
84 Pamela S. Karlen, Nothing Personal : The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno 
to Bush v. Gore, 79 N. Car. L. Rev. 1345, 1350 (2001). 
85 Id. 
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incumbents seek to put themselves beyond the reach of the voters’ judgment is certainly 
as real an injury as the claim of the white voters in Shaw v. Reno that they felt 
disenfranchised. The fact is that Shaw imposed on the political process a requirement of 
color blindedness based on no showing of real injury to the plaintiffs. In contrast, voters 
suffer a real injury when all the significant choices have been made before they enter the 
polling booth.  
 
b.   The Political Question Doctrine
In Baker v. Carr, the Court identified six concerns which could each justify invocation 
of the political question doctrine.86 Among them, in addition to lack of manageable 
standards discussed above, was «the impossibility of deciding [the question] without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. » 87 
Does a claim of excessive incumbent protection gerrymandering raise such a question? 
Given the variety and importance of cases in which the Court has effectively made policy 
determinations governing the political process, this concern, whatever applicability it 
might have had half a century ago, should certainly not now bar consideration of an 
incumbent gerrymandering claim. 
 
As one scholar recently wrote: 
 
« In the past decade alone, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
has found itself in the center of major electoral questions. It 
found the imposition of term limits on U.S. Senators and 
House members unconstitutional, effectively nullifying the 
most popular and widespread grassroots political reform in 
decades. The Court has essentially outlawed political 
patronage – the effect of which, many observers would 
argue, has irreparably damaged partisan organizations’s 
governing and campaign capabilities. At the same time, the 
Court has upheld state laws that make it virtually 
impossible for minor or new parties effectively to challenge 
the two party status quo. It has considered the 
constitutionality of racial, partisan and religious 
redistricting and has barred ballot initiatives limiting civil 
liberites. »88 
It is difficult to see how the incumbent protection gerrymander raises any more of a 
political question than any of the other redistricting cases cited in the above passage 
 
86 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
87 Id. 
88 David K. Ryden, The U.S. Supreme Court, the Electoral Process, and the Quest for Representation : An 
Overview, in The Supreme Court and the Electoral Process, David K. Ryden, ed., p. 4 (2002). 
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not to mention the cited cases dealing with the constitutionality of term limits and 
political patronage. 89 
Moreover, the political question formulation, like the standing requirement, is 
rooted in a respect for the separation of powers.90 Separation of powers, however, 
should  not bar entertaining an incumbent gerrymandering claim because (a) the 
Congress can hardly be expected to regulate a practice which so clearly benefits its 
membership; (b) in any event we are dealing with the actions of state legislatures or 
other state created bodies, not Congress; and (c) separation of powers is not a 
particularly compelling concept when the legislature is in effect is acting as a 
committee of the whole for the two party system rather than in its traditional 
legislative capacity. 
 
c.  Federalism
Regulation of incumbent gerrymandering should not be avoided by the federal 
judiciary out of concerns for federalism, at least in the case of districting for the House of 
Representatives. The reasons are partly historic, partly structural, and partly peculiar to 
the nature of the incumbency gerrymander claim itself. 
 
The historic part deals with the framer’s intention respecting the House of 
Representatives. The Senate was supposed to address the interests of the States, the 
House the interests of the people. Madison makes this very clear in No. 39 of the 
Federalist papers.91 Thus, the States, as political units, have no constitutionally based 
interest in redistricting. This is important because one of the key defenses for incumbent 
gerrymandering is that it increases the influence of the State in a body where power and 
influence are based in substantial part on seniority. It should also be noted that (a) the 
Senate, not the House, is the legislative body which the Supreme Court has held to be the 
primary protector of state sovereignty92 and (b) any constitutional rule respecting 
incumbent gerrymandering will be applicable to all the States and will not therefore put 
any one of them at a disadvantage.  
 
From a structural standpoint, deference out of a respect for state or local autonomy is  
neither necessary nor appropriate when the issue is one of establishing appropriate 
constitutional norms for election to a national office.  
 
89 See Note 87 for a brief enumeration of cases in which the Court has addressed aspects of the political 
process. 
90 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
91 In Federalist No. 39 Madison wrote : « The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the 
people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as 
they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far, the government is national, not federal. The Senate, 
on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies.. » (my 
emphasis). The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1961, Harvard University 
Press) reprinted in Barnes and Noble Books p. 283 (2004). 
92 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). 
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Finally, deference is not appropriate in the circumstances of an incumbent gerrymander 
for the same reason it was not appropriate in Kramer v. Union School District.93 That 
case involved a challenge to a state law that provided that only certain school district 
residents, those owning or renting property or with children enrolled in local public 
schools, could vote in school district elections.  In evaluating the equal protection claim 
raised by an excluded person living in the District, the Court declared that in reviewing 
statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of 
constitutionality afforded state statutes was not applicable. The Court reasoned: 
 
« The presumption of constitutionality and the approval 
given ‘rational’ classifications in other types of enactments 
are based on an assumption that the institutions of state 
government are structured so as to represent fairly all the 
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in 
effect a challenge to this basic assumption, the assumption 
can no longer serve as the basis for presuming 
constitutionality. »94 
I would submit that the Court’s reasoning in Kramer is equally germane to an attack on 
the constitutionality of a pervasive incumbent gerrymander since such an attack also 
challenges the basic assumption of fairness which would otherwise entitle a state statute 
to some deference. 
 
3.  The Remedy
Professor Daryl Levinson has argued that the distinction between rights and remedies 
in constitutional law is a false dichotomy and that constitutional rights and remedies are 
« inextricably intertwined».95 In the constitutional model he presents, constitutional rights 
are « dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their 
scope, shape and very existence. »96 
Professor Levinson’s insights strike a responsive chord in analyzing the issue of the 
incumbent protection gerrymander. Does every attempt at protecting an incumbent 
constitute a constitutional violation? That would arguably mean that every district in 
which incumbent protection was the primary motive for drawing the district line would 
need to be redrawn. If the constitutional violation only occurs when incumbent protection 
becomes too pervasive a redistricting theme, then the remedy can be limited to 
discouraging that practice.  
 
93 395 U.S. 621 (1969) 
94 Id. at 628. 
95 Id. at 858. 
96 Id. 
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 But there is a problem: How is a court to fashion a remedy that will make some 
incumbents vulnerable but not others? Courts would seem to face the almost impossible 
task of choosing which districts must be redrawn. As one article has noted, « The major 
stumbling block for the weak anti-incumbent criterion, » which the authors define as a 
criterion which would allow for some but not too much incumbent protection, « is how to 
determine which incumbents should be sacrificed. »97 
I would submit, however, that the judiciary need not make that determination in 
fashioning its remedy.  
 
Rather, since the violation is an abuse of a delegated power, then the remedy is to 
deprive that body of the right to exercise that power for that particular redistricting cycle 
by substituting a different process. As long as the plan is drawn by someone other than 
the self-interested legislators themselves under standards that include competitiveness as 
a constitutional value, then by definition the constitutional violation has to a considerable 
extent already been remedied. 98 
The process for districting in Iowa provides for a non-partisan commission to draft the 
initial redistricting plan and specifically forbids the commission from considering 
political data in formulating that plan.99 Adopting the Iowa process or some variant 
thereof as a remedial tool for a districting plan that has gone too far in protecting 
incumbents would not require any specific electoral outcome.  It would redress the 
unconstitutional balance created by that plan and would impose a penalty on the 
legislature by effectively prohibiting any incumbent protection under the new plan to be 
adopted. 
 
A legislature operating in a constitutional environment in which incumbency 
protection if carried to an extreme will result in the redistricting process being taken out 
of its hands for that census cycle is likely to take steps to assure that such an outcome 
does not occur.100 Once, therefore, legislatures get the message that competitiveness is a 
constitutional value which must be recognized, our congressional elections are likely in 
fact to meet their original goal of providing a measure of accountability and 
responsiveness to public opinion. That would be the beneficial result of the proposed 
remedy but the remedy itself would come simply from the substitution of a process in 
accord with constitutional standards for a process which failed to meet those standards. 
 
97 Supra, Note 46 at p. 46 .  
98 Current constitutional practice is to allow the legislature to redraw district lines found to be 
unconstitutional. Upham v. Seamon 456 U.S. 37, 41 (1982). I would question whether such a practice 
should be required for a violation based on pervasive incumbent gerrymandering since the incentive for the 
legislature to continue to protect its own will be as powerful the second time around as the first. Also, 
certainty that redistricting authority will be taken from it will be the strongest and perhaps the only real 
incentive the legislature will have for getting things right the first time. 
99 Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 837 at 848 (1997). 
100 For a more extended discussion of this point, see Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and 
Incumbency :Leading the Legislature to Police Itself, 4 Journal of Law and Politics 653, 687 to 689, (1987-
1988). 
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 Whatever remedial process is ultimately devised by the judiciary, and there doesn’t 
necessarily need to be one size fits all, the process should be an open one with hearings 
and input from the public and from legislative representatives. That the legislature might 
have lost its chance to be the ultimate decision-making authority in the redistricting 
process by reason of its gerrymander does not mean that it should not have the 
opportunity to make its views known to the new decision-maker, whether it be an 
independent commission, a special master appointed by the Court, or some form of 
arbitration panel.  
 
Whether or not the revised plan will actually result in more competitive elections is not 
a judgment that the judiciary needs to make. Rather, judicial oversight of the remedial 
process can and should be confined to the question whether in creating the revised plan, 
the decision-maker did not consider incumbent protection as a primary factor in drawing 
district lines and did make some effort to include competitiveness as a value in the 
process.  
 
One scholar opposed to an active judicial role in the regulation of gerrymandering has 
written: « When the Court considers whether and how to regulate politics, it should resist 
reforms requiring blunt remedial tools that threaten to transform, rather than refine, the 
American political system. »101 
While the caution is a good one, the fact is that incumbent gerrymandering and the 
growing sophistication and power with which it has been applied, has itself worked a 
transformation in our political system. Not only has it completely warped the reality of 
electoral politics but, as previously discussed, it has arguably contributed in a significant 
way to the polarization of our two major political parties into warring ideological camps. 
 
The proposed corrective remedy is, in any event, not blunt but it is meant to restore 
some sense of balance to the process by which redistricting lines are drawn. It does not 
require a particular result and it can only be imposed when a plan falls short of meeting a 
clearly discernable measure of competitiveness and there is no reasonable explanation 
offered to explain the failure to meet that standard. Moreover, the local federal district 
court judges, much more knowledgeable about the political culture of their State than the 
Supreme Court, should have wide latitude to fashion a process that fits within that culture 
and to judge whether the basic requirement that some effort have been made to consider 
competitiveness as a value has been met.  Whether or not increased competitiveness 
results from such a plan will ultimately be up to the voters but at least they will know that 
their vote did not occur in a Potemkin Village created by their government to foster the 
illusion but deny the reality of a meaningful election. 
 
.
101 Peter H. Schuck, “The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Judicial Regulation of 
Politics,” 87 Col. L. Rev. 1325, 1330 (1987). 
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4.  A Few Other Considerations
There are three other considerations deserving  brief mention which support judicial 
regulation of pervasive incumbent gerrymanders.: First, regulation is consistent with the 
reasoning of most of the major approaches to constitutional adjudication; Second,  
judicial involvement would not jeopardize the standing of the Court given the widespread 
public concern over the entrenched power of incumbency; Third, incumbent protection is 
inconsistent with the Court’s view respecting incumbency set forth in its major decision 
dealing with political patronage.     
 
a. Consistency with prevailing approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Pervasive incumbent gerrymanders should distress those embracing a variety of 
interpretive theories and approaches to constitutional adjudication.  
 
For the originalist, a practice which so clearly sabotages the framers’ intent respecting 
responsiveness and accountability of elections should be of great concern. And there is 
nothing in orginalism that requires the Court from forbearing to address this problem. 
Professor Whittington has written: 
 
« . The judiciary is not a problem to be worked into 
American constitutionalism but an integral component of 
that enterprise, and it is positively authorized to take action 
under it. In that context, judicial passivism is appropriate at 
the limits of interpretive knowledge but is distinctly 
inappropriate when the constitutional law is available to be 
interpreted and applied. »102 
For those particularly mindful of constitutional law as a form of common law, the 
incredible growth in the computing power of today’s technology and the amount of 
information to which that technology can be applied means that incumbent protection 
gerrymanders today are much more effective in fixing election outcomes than they were 
even 30 or 40 years ago. Thus, a practice which might not have seemed as threatening in 
the past can legitimately be seen as a much different, more potent problem today. 
 
Regulation of pervasive incumbent gerrymandering also furthers the goal of 
representation reinforcement and participation set out in famous Footnote 4 of the 
Carolene Products case103 and in Professor Ely’s work104 because, as previously 
discussed, pervasive incumbent gerrymanders essentially lock into our governance an 
anti-democratic practice not easily remedied by normal political processes. 
 
102 Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation : Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial 
Review, 168 (1999). 
103 United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144 at 152-153 (1938). 
104 See particularly John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust,  A Theory of Judicial Review, (1980). 
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Finally, those who regard themselves as majoritarians should be particularly distrustful 
of a redistricting motive which allows legislators to handpick their own majorities and 
entrench themselves in power. Majoritarians should also be especially concerned about 
incumbent gerrymandering in light of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton which, as previously 
discussed, prohibits majorities from imposing term limits on their congressional 
representatives.  
 
I would submit that the appeal for regulating incumbent gerrymandering is heightened 
by the fact that it can be seen as furthering a variety of interpretive approaches. 
 
b.  Acceptance.
Clearly, the judiciary should be wary of undertaking a role which risks its institutional 
legitimacy. Obviously, this is a risk that the Court has been willing to undertake from 
time to time.105 More to the point, however, judicial concern regarding incumbent 
protection would only mirror widespread public concern over the same subject and thus, 
if done appropriately, would likely enhance, not diminish the stature of the Court. 
 
c.  Elrod v. Burns.
Pervasive incumbent protection gerrymanders are also inconsistent with part of the 
Court’s rationale in Elrod v. Burns. 106In that case, the Court prohibited political 
patronage for employees other than policymakers in part on the ground that « Patronage 
tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice’s scope 
is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the process can be 
significant. »107 Certainly, if political patronage raises constitutional concerns because it 
tips the electoral process in favor of incumbency, so should incumbent gerrymandering, a 
much more direct means to the same end. 
 
Conclusion
In Part I of this article, I proposed three separate foundations upon which a 
constitutional claim against pervasive incumbent gerrymandering might be laid consistent 
with current Supreme Court precedents. I then attempted to show why the Supreme Court 
can and should declare such gerrymanders unconstitutional and, in the process, have 
 
105 I would cite Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) as Exhibit A. The fact that the Supreme Court’s decision, 
essentially determining the outcome of a closely contested presidential election, did not lead to a major 
questioning by the public of the Court’s role in the political process should certainly fortify the Court’s 
courage in taking on the issue of incumbent protection if such fortification is necessary. 
106 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
107 Id. at 356. 
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offered some tentative suggestions respecting the specifics of a possible standard and 
remedy. 
 
The claim that I have described recognizes that some degree of incumbent 
gerrymandering is inevitable and locates the constitutional violation in a scheme in which 
incumbent protection is so extreme, on a statewide basis, that competitiveness, 
accountability and the robust interaction our democracy contemplates have been 
effectively eliminated. The actual harms created by these results include denying 
independent voters the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political system, 
undermining the very reason we have elections, and the disintegration of a stable and 
effective two party system into a jigsaw puzzle of one-party systems in which 
nominations in effect substitute for elections.  
 
Someone once drew the distinction between a genuine conversation and an apparent 
conversation which is really nothing more than a series of intersecting monologues. Our 
politics today have become a series of intersecting monologues. We need to restore the 
conversation. Recognizing competitiveness as a constitutional value that needs to be 
balanced against incumbent protection would be a step in that direction. 
 
